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Preface
If the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin. Charles Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle (1839 Beagle ( /1936 This book is about suffering, healing, and evolved human nature. It is about the mundane suffering that is wrought by our very nature, and why knowledge of this nature is our best hope for healing the suffering that it so often brings. The shape of my argument is this:
(1) what our nature is, (2) why it is this way, and (3) why knowledge of why it is this way has therapeutic implications. I believe that my overall argument follows logically from my most basic assumption, which is that human beings have a nature. There are two reason why I am happy with this assumption. First, I believe that we are part of nature, part of life. Therefore, because evolutionary theory is our only scientific theory of life, for me, literally everything about life is ultimately explainable in terms of evolutionary theory or terms compatible therewith. Second, not only do I believe that human nature is a fact of nature, I also believe that value exists as a fact of nature and that knowledge of the value that is in life, including ourselves, would constitute an extremely valuable set of facts. Indeed, since the continuation of our species (our descendants) may depend on knowing and accepting our nature, I cannot imagine any more valuable set of facts. This book is about using evolutionary theory to understand human nature in order thereby to heal and preserve human life and life in general. It is therefore an essay in evolutionary medicine. It is an essay on the use of evolutionary theory as a rational basis for human problem-solving. It is therefore also an exercise in what Julian Huxley (1964) called "evolutionary humanism." Human nature is that which we have in common despite our differences. It is that which transforms us from local partisans with cramped loyalties into kosmou politēs, "citizens of the universe," with allegiances to what we undeniably share: the qualities of life. In the coming pages I will paint a picture of human nature that is emerging from recent thinking at the interface of evolutionary theory and human development about the evolved nature and contingent development of human reproductive strategies. I will describe this thinking and what we know about reproductive strategies in considerable detail in succeeding chapters. For now, however, it is enough to define a reproductive strategy loosely as the sum of all the adaptations -anatomical, physiological, psychological, and developmental -that enabled all of the (direct) ancestors of all organisms that ever lived to solve the problems that had to be solved in order for them to have left descendants. These adaptations are the qualities of life.
To set the stage for what follows I must emphasize at the outset that, while evolutionary biologists believe that organisms actually do possess -indeed are -such adaptations (and their by-products), and that many can be convincingly demonstrated, the concept of reproductive strategy is fundamentally an assumption, which means that it is a working hypothesis, a mental model, an image or a way of seeing, rather than an empirically established entity. An assumption is the if that comes before a then. In the act of determining whether some then that we predict actually exists, we have assumed that the if that precedes it is true. Or, as Pierre Ryckmans put it recently, "The saying 'to see is to believe' must be reversed: to believe [to assume] is to see" (1996:13). Darwin was getting at the same idea when he wrote to Alfred Russel Wallace in 1857, "I am a firm believer that without speculation there is no good and original observation" (Burkhardt 1996:183) .
In evolutionary theory this has proved to be an extraordinarily powerful and productive problem-solving gambit. To assume that human nature is fundamentally, essentially about reproduction is to adopt what Dennett (1987 , 1995 see also Fodor 1994) calls the "intentional stance," which is to assume that the qualities of life -adaptations -are for something, that they were intended by some imaginary agent (say, a blind watchmaker [Dawkins 1986 ]) to solve some problem. We do not really believe this, of course, any more than we believe that each and every biological trait actually is an adaptation (more on this later). However, the fundamental logic of the process of adaptation by natural selection that is embodied in the intentional stance allows us to make predictions about the nature of the problems that organisms in particular ecological or political-economic circumstances will face, which, in turn, often gives hints about the kinds of solutions (adaptations) that we might look for. This is what evolutionary ecology is all about. This why I believe that the concept of reproductive strategy can contribute substantially to new perspectives on human nature: because it helps us to understand the adap- From these basic assumptions, I work toward the conclusion that it is not only possible, but indeed valuable to view human nature as a manifestation of our reproductive strategies and thus as a natural, biological phenomenon. I maintain, however, that this can be only cold comfort to outdated "greedy" reductionists who believe in some fixed, universal human nature. This is because an essential part of human nature is the way that it evolved to be reliably, adaptively affected during development by certain kinds of information about young human beings' local socioecology. From my combined evolutionary/developmental perspective, in fact, human nature comes to be seen as essentially, biologically, adaptively local, contingent, and emergent.
1 Not only does the view of human nature as a manifestation of our reproductive strategies increase our understanding of human nature, such a view also provides a rational, scientific basis for a theory of value and an ethical stance that combines reason and compassion, that says it is rational to be compassionate, and that can help us ameliorate our all-too-human condition. From assumptions about the essential reproductive function of human nature -that human nature is ultimately for reproduction -I develop a rational, evolutionary theoretical foundation for an ethical stance that aims to be therapeutic by increasing our practical reason. Indeed, in some ways this book amounts to one long argument against G. E. Moore's (1903) naturalistic fallacy -the idea that it is wrong to argue from facts to values. The structure of my therapeutic argument is the proposition that if human nature is a manifestation of our reproductive strategies, and if our reproductive strategies evolved to be reliably affected by certain features of the environments in which we develop, then the essence of human nature, the part we care about most, our minds and moral sentiments, must be at least partly contingent on these same environmental features. And what environmental features are these? What are our minds and moral sentiments for? What particular problems did they evolve to solve? As I will show in the coming chapters, evolutionary theory and human development are (for different reasons) coming to conceive of these problems in terms of environmental risk and uncertainty, which is how evolutionary ecologists refer abstractly to threats to an organism's survival or its potential for leaving descendants. I believe that when human nature is viewed from a conjoined evolutionary/developmental perspective, our minds and moral sentiments emerge as essentially adaptations for predicting the future. Predicting the future reduces environmental risk and uncertainty, thereby reducing the chance of death, nurturing growth and development, and providing hope for future generations. For evolutionists, future generations are what reproductive strategies -sexare meant to achieve. In short, predicting the future maximizes the chance of reaching the future. This, I shall argue, is the origin of value itself. And, because inequality is a major source of risk and uncertainty, it is also a reason for valuing equality and human rights.
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